Ursinus Intro Ethics Blog - Section A

Blog week #5 begins here -- this is a separator post to help you see which posts to focus on.

Blog week #4 begins here -- this is a separator post to help you see which posts to focus on.

On the topic of who should count when determining overall well being of a population, I believe that the line has to be drawn at humans. Although some animals may be able to recognize when they are being treated badly, they don’t understand the concept of well-being. If they are unable to recognize well-being and the morality of creating the most good possible, then they will also be unable to contribute in that way to the society. Although pets may add to the overall well being, they do not do so consciously and therefore it is the person that placed the pet in that situation that added to the good. If someone is going to base a moral belief completely on the attempt to maximize the amount of good in the world, only beings that are able to contribute to the good of others should be considered in the society. I am not saying that it is alright to hurt animals because they are not at the same level as humans, but that the well being of an animal should not be considered more important than that of a human. I do think that the injuring of an animal for one person’s pleasure is a bad thing, even in the utilitarian view. Many people believe that hurting an animal is a horrible thing to do and that animal may have created some sort of happiness in someone’s life, so by killing the animal, it would have removed good from the world, and that pain would be lasting and perhaps more intense than the pleasure derived from harming the animal. In this way, it is not the animal’s well-being being taken into account; it is the good of the humans that were affected by the animal.

Our class discussion revolved around a human life being the only type of life that mattered or "counted". I can not accept this to be true for a number of reasons. By setting a cat on fire it is referred to as animal cruelly. In many states there are laws protecting the rights of animals that we consider pets. Therefore by setting a cat on fire or any other animal for that matter, it is against the law. Other animals are also noted for their ability to follow commands and solve problems. Dolphins are an example of an animal that is considered to be the most intelligent species aside from humans. Another interesting aspect to consider is what separates animals from humans. In CIE we all have discussed what it means to be human, but in class discussion my class only pointed out that the key difference between an animal and a human was a more complex mental state or the ability to express our thoughts and feelings. Upon putting much thought into this question, I have realized that there is not much that distinguishes an animal from a human being aside from some higher aspect of conscious thought. There is no question that our life is valued more because we have a higher mental capacity, but that is no reason for an animal life to mean nothing. The line does in fact have to be drawn somewhere, but in my opinion it should be left up to the person facing the situation to decide and make the better judgment.

I'm going to take a turn from what most people have been blogging about and take a look at the reading that was assigned from the book for today: Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility by John Stuart Mill on pages 119-123.

The reading itself addresses two types of sanctions, or sources of approval, that are applicable to all theories of morality: external and internal. Mill explains how utilitarianism fits into these molds and therefore constitutes a genuine moral theory. He goes on to say that "[t]he internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same-- a feeling in our own mind" (pg. 120). Essentially, this internal sanction comes down to our Conscience (Mill captialized it, not me). Our internal forces regarding ethics and morality, Mill admits, are simply our personal feelings (as he says, "whatever our standard [...] may be") on the matter.

I think this is very interesting to note. In class, when we talk about utilitarianism, it is often portrayed as a rigid doctrine, but Mill in fact concedes that an internal factor, different for each individual, affects the theory's influence on both its followers and enemies. It seems to me that he admits that one should do whatever one feels is right in the end. He simply believes that utilitarianism can explain what stimulates our consciences. It's an optimistic theory about maximizing goodness and happiness and all of the things we've been talking about in class. Sure, it has its complications, but in the end, practically speaking, we all put a lot of weight on our educated consciences to make decisions and no one rigidly follows any particular doctrine as it would be described in a textbook definition. I like that Mill identifies this point in his writing and doesn't deny it, but rather tries to show that you can have it both ways; your intuition will lead you to tend toward a certain pattern of moral behavior which may or may not be utilitarianism.

Blog week #3 begins here -- this is a separator post to help you see which posts to focus on.

Let me address Steve's argument on several points.

How can a person admit it’s bad for them, and still choose to do it in their own self interest?

How are you defining self-interest here? Certainly if a person admits it's bad for them, then they know that it's unhealthy, but why not self-interested? The act of consuming junk food evidently gives them pleasure (as per their argument), and perhaps he or she prefers to feel pleasured, happy, etc. in the short term even though they know that their health will suffer.

The argument that people act in ways they believe to be in their self interest has more credibility...

This is a logical conclusion from your premises, but are you then promoting objective self-interest? It seems that self-interest should be concerned with the "self" and thus to assume objectivity is tempting, but unfair. Objectively one might know that the person is engaged in destructive behavior, and, as you say, the person might even admit that their actions are "bad" for them, they might still consider it in their best self-interest at the moment to continue in this behavior. Momentary pleasure for long-term losses, so to speak.

In one of the comments, another poster made the point that people who are addicted to various substances continue destructive behavior because they "can't help themselves," and rightfully notes that addiction is a complex topic which seems to support your claim that people do things against their self-interest, even when they don't want to ... but the case, without taking up any more space, is simply to difficult to peg down. Is it in the addict's immediate self-interest to satisfy his addiction? Are you acting in your self-interest when you do something wrong out of fear, because doing that thing is better than facing the fear itself? Or, as the submitter asked, is it in your self-interest to obey the law, or your parents, over your morality (or to satisy theirs)? Food for further consideration.

Thanks for getting the blog off to a good start during its first week!

The new blogging period starts here. (I insert this separator post to help you see which posts to focus on.)

I really like the drowning child comparison, and I thought he really made some good insights in describing why helping starvation in Bengali does not apply to this analogy. After pinning peoples’ lack of guilt on the lack of condemnation and pointing the finger at others not helping, he reveals the biggest obstacle: we’re not up close and personal to the problem, like we would be if we were put in the position of saving a drowning child. I would think one would have to save the drowning child because of the clear and present urgency of the situation, but because people don’t see the starvation problem up close, they may tend to ignore or put pleas for help in the back of their minds. I know I’ve been guilty of this before (especially when it comes to giving blood).

I think the lack of derision for not contributing mixed with the fact that Bengali’s starvation does not directly affect anyone here renders most Americans apathetic towards the issue. Donations are appreciated but not expected, and like Singer says, this is wrong. Americans, in general, could benefit from giving more. Taking a little money out of the economy and giving it to a place of need wouldn’t hurt that much. People may definitely loose jobs if we take a significant amount of money out of the economy, but its not like even close to everybody has jobs now anyway. Thus, why not sacrifice a little and help a much bigger issue?

Another underlined message in his article was the fact that as a whole, society isn’t getting it done. So to improve, we must act first as individuals. For once, don’t look to the next person to go first, but instead, take the initiative and do something productive. (We might get more pleasure out of knowing we made a difference than any electronic possession can every bring us.)

[Posted in behalf of Jamey Cooper]

Singer is ostensibly arguing for society – specifically Western society – to subscribe to a moral proof suffering and death are bad, and that if one has the ability to prevent something bad without suffering anything of [comparable] moral significance (and we do), then we are morally obligated to do whatever is in our power to help. This is fine. But what Singer masks is that his argument is actually for the reader to look away from the construction of that Western society; that is, in part to "sacrifice the benefits of a consumer society" (243) for moral good. The implication, therefore, is that the consequences of benefiting from a capitalist society are fundamentally immoral if some of those benefits aren't put to those less fortunate. Singer is wise to admit that he is not morally neutral, and it may well be that capitalism is morally bereft, but his argument does not take the time to delve into what the definition of "comparable moral significance" actually would be from society to society. Should individuals in wealthier counties help more; contribute more? Certainly. Perhaps consumer society does "have a distorting effect on the goals and purposes of its members" (241), but by the same token it is unreasonable to collude the needs of a person in the third world with the first, and to consider poverty as merely a lack of food, shelter, or medical care, across the board. What may fall under the category of moral comparability in one society is likely to be very different from the next. Thus, while the fundamental proof is sound, the second on third premises are game for interpretation, and perhaps Singer should have been more forthright in acknowledging the direct political implications of his argument.

Singer brings up a very important point about how the actions a person in our society takes are influenced by the expectations of the people around him. He states “What it is possible for a man to do and what he is likely to do are both, I think, very greatly influenced by what people around him are doing and expecting him to do” (Singer 237). This, I believe, is the reason that more is not done to help other societies around the world that require aid. It is not the fact that people feel like they are not able to sacrifice any of their funds, or even that they just don’t want to. It is the simple fact that no guilt is placed upon them if they let other people starve.
Many other moral obligations have some sort of societal consequence when a person doesn’t follow them. If a person treats others poorly, it will end up having an effect on his or her daily life, whether it is through their relationship with others or the guilt that is felt. As with Singer’s example of the boy drowning, a person would be looked down upon if they just stood there and watched the boy drown, instead of trying to help to his or her best ability. For many people, they may not want to help or go out of their way to save the boy, but it is ingrained into their mind that to save the child is the “right” thing to do.
Sadly, people may only feel guilt for not helping those far away who need aid when they fear that others will judge them for not helping.

As far as I can tell, Singer's argument regarding helping victims of starvation is sound. If one accepts his premises to be true, which I do, they are logical enough to be considered valid. However, I do not agree with Singer's position on the extent to which we as middle class Americans are morally obligated to act on his conclusion: "We [morally] ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance" (238).


Singer attempts to address my rebuttal (240-242), but there are several flaws, one of which I would like to address. Putting aside the "strong version" (241) of giving, focusing only on the moderate one, Singer claims that one is required "to give away to ensure that the consumer society [...] would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely" (241). Our economy thrives upon such manifestations of the free market, and to purposefully seek to damage our own society in such a way can also be seen as "sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance." Singer claims that the consideration of reducing our economy does not "affect the question of how much an individual should give in a society in which very few are giving substantial amounts" (242), and such a distinction weakens his argument. This mention of the fact that few people are giving enough according to Singer's standards suggests that perhaps he would change his tune if more people were, in fact, giving what he considers to be enough. Since Singer holds the drastic "strong version" it is even more difficult to reach his ideal giving situation. He puts a higher importance on the abolition of starvation worldwide than maintaining a stable economy for the good of our society.


Due to the subjectivity of what it means to sacrifice something of "moral importance," I don't believe that it is really possible to reach a conclusion about the amount morally required to assist with the efforts of abating world hunger, or at least not based on the premises that Singer provides. While he offers a fundamental premise about what is morally bad ("suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care" (231)), Singer does not, or perhaps cannot, define what is of moral importance in a simple, defendable premise. So, while I agree with Singer that one is morally obligated to contribute to the care of those who are suffering from starvation, I do not agree with his claims that one should give to the point of marginal utility or destruction of the consumer portion of our economy.

I agree with the conclusion that Singer has drawn that those not suffering from lack of food, shelter, or medical care should help to prevent poverty. For example if there was prior knowledge that a hurricane was coming, it would only make sense to take precautions which would prevent the most damage from occurring. Furthermore, if we have the means to save someone from starvation by sacrificing a small portion of our income, it would only make sense to do so. This is an agreeable argument as well as an attack on the morality of those who do not acknowledge or participate in trying to better the lives of people living in squalor. It can be inferred that morality is the concept of good and bad in which not sacrificing something would lead to having bad morals. Those who choose to ignore the facts about poverty or find fault with donating to charity, have made a choice to lead a life in which is focused on themselves and not the good of man kind. It does not matter who you are, where you are from or how much money you have, there is always something you can give. This view which I present does not mean that one should focus on the needs of others before his or her own family, but rather to give up a small luxury in return for possibly saving a life. However, it is in my experience that people are more inclined to place blame on other factors, rather then taking the responsibility to lend a hand. It is human nature to make up an excuse rather then initiate change. Change therefore is the motivating factor that drives humans to make a difference; whether it is as simple as donating old clothes or sending money to a forgotten child in East Bengal dying of starvation.