Monday, September 04, 2006
How much is enough?
As far as I can tell, Singer's argument regarding helping victims of starvation is sound. If one accepts his premises to be true, which I do, they are logical enough to be considered valid. However, I do not agree with Singer's position on the extent to which we as middle class Americans are morally obligated to act on his conclusion: "We [morally] ought to be preventing as much suffering as we can without sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance" (238).
Singer attempts to address my rebuttal (240-242), but there are several flaws, one of which I would like to address. Putting aside the "strong version" (241) of giving, focusing only on the moderate one, Singer claims that one is required "to give away to ensure that the consumer society [...] would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely" (241). Our economy thrives upon such manifestations of the free market, and to purposefully seek to damage our own society in such a way can also be seen as "sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance." Singer claims that the consideration of reducing our economy does not "affect the question of how much an individual should give in a society in which very few are giving substantial amounts" (242), and such a distinction weakens his argument. This mention of the fact that few people are giving enough according to Singer's standards suggests that perhaps he would change his tune if more people were, in fact, giving what he considers to be enough. Since Singer holds the drastic "strong version" it is even more difficult to reach his ideal giving situation. He puts a higher importance on the abolition of starvation worldwide than maintaining a stable economy for the good of our society.
Due to the subjectivity of what it means to sacrifice something of "moral importance," I don't believe that it is really possible to reach a conclusion about the amount morally required to assist with the efforts of abating world hunger, or at least not based on the premises that Singer provides. While he offers a fundamental premise about what is morally bad ("suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care" (231)), Singer does not, or perhaps cannot, define what is of moral importance in a simple, defendable premise. So, while I agree with Singer that one is morally obligated to contribute to the care of those who are suffering from starvation, I do not agree with his claims that one should give to the point of marginal utility or destruction of the consumer portion of our economy.
Singer attempts to address my rebuttal (240-242), but there are several flaws, one of which I would like to address. Putting aside the "strong version" (241) of giving, focusing only on the moderate one, Singer claims that one is required "to give away to ensure that the consumer society [...] would slow down and perhaps disappear entirely" (241). Our economy thrives upon such manifestations of the free market, and to purposefully seek to damage our own society in such a way can also be seen as "sacrificing something else of comparable moral importance." Singer claims that the consideration of reducing our economy does not "affect the question of how much an individual should give in a society in which very few are giving substantial amounts" (242), and such a distinction weakens his argument. This mention of the fact that few people are giving enough according to Singer's standards suggests that perhaps he would change his tune if more people were, in fact, giving what he considers to be enough. Since Singer holds the drastic "strong version" it is even more difficult to reach his ideal giving situation. He puts a higher importance on the abolition of starvation worldwide than maintaining a stable economy for the good of our society.
Due to the subjectivity of what it means to sacrifice something of "moral importance," I don't believe that it is really possible to reach a conclusion about the amount morally required to assist with the efforts of abating world hunger, or at least not based on the premises that Singer provides. While he offers a fundamental premise about what is morally bad ("suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care" (231)), Singer does not, or perhaps cannot, define what is of moral importance in a simple, defendable premise. So, while I agree with Singer that one is morally obligated to contribute to the care of those who are suffering from starvation, I do not agree with his claims that one should give to the point of marginal utility or destruction of the consumer portion of our economy.
# posted by Angela @ 6:41 PM 
