Monday, September 04, 2006

 

Politics, Progress

Singer is ostensibly arguing for society – specifically Western society – to subscribe to a moral proof suffering and death are bad, and that if one has the ability to prevent something bad without suffering anything of [comparable] moral significance (and we do), then we are morally obligated to do whatever is in our power to help. This is fine. But what Singer masks is that his argument is actually for the reader to look away from the construction of that Western society; that is, in part to "sacrifice the benefits of a consumer society" (243) for moral good. The implication, therefore, is that the consequences of benefiting from a capitalist society are fundamentally immoral if some of those benefits aren't put to those less fortunate. Singer is wise to admit that he is not morally neutral, and it may well be that capitalism is morally bereft, but his argument does not take the time to delve into what the definition of "comparable moral significance" actually would be from society to society. Should individuals in wealthier counties help more; contribute more? Certainly. Perhaps consumer society does "have a distorting effect on the goals and purposes of its members" (241), but by the same token it is unreasonable to collude the needs of a person in the third world with the first, and to consider poverty as merely a lack of food, shelter, or medical care, across the board. What may fall under the category of moral comparability in one society is likely to be very different from the next. Thus, while the fundamental proof is sound, the second on third premises are game for interpretation, and perhaps Singer should have been more forthright in acknowledging the direct political implications of his argument.


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